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ABSTRACT 
This study examines readiness measurement systems in both the U.S. and 
the Republic of China (ROC). The purpose of the study is to suggest a new 
readiness measurement system for the ROC. After the Introduction, the 
geopolitical position of the ROC is examined to determine likely missions for the 
ROC Armed Forces. Next, the current readiness measurement systems used in the 
U.S. and the ROC are surveyed. Chapter IV presents a proposed system for 
measuring readiness based on expert system technology. The final chapter presents 
conclusions and recommendations for a readiness measurement system. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
With the end of the cold war and the downsizing of militaries throughout the 
world, civilian populations seek a reduction in the cost of maintaining their armed forces. 
This has recently led to the concept of small but very high quality military forces for the 
defense of a nation. The Republic of China (ROC), like many other nations, wishes to 
downsize their military forces while at the same time, maintaining, if not increasing, their 
quality. 
Readiness is the measure of the quality of a nation's armed forces from the point 
of view of the nation's military and political leaders. To measure readiness, a scale must 
be developed based on the equipment and capabilities of a military unit in the context of 
the missions assigned to a nation's armed forces by its government. 
In the post cold war world, countries that previously could assure themselves that 
they had prepared their armed forces for the most probable conflict, find themselves 
facing a world where a nation may not know what it will be required of its military forces 
in its defense. In this case, the ROC is fortunate because the nation's most probable 
enemy is readily identified and therefore, the missions that are likely to be assigned to the 
ROC's Armed Forces are also easily known. 
This study examines readiness measurement systems used in both the United 
States and ROC. The purpose of this examination is to propose a system for measuring 
the readiness of the ROC's Armed Forces using modem computer technologies. The 
unique position of the ROC in the defense of the Island of Taiwan means that the ROC's 
Armed Forces can adopt methods for measuring readiness and supporting those forces 
that cannot be adopted by other nations with more extensive global commitments. 
Recently, Mainland China has reached agreements with its neighbors of Russia, 
Kazakhstan, India, and Vietnam which will allow Mainland China to redeploy their 
military forces to the military regions near ROC. Whereas, cold war tensions have 
decreased in most of the world, the opposite is true for the ROC. Also recently, Mainland 
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China has attempted to influence the elections on Taiwan. These events make it essential 
that the ROC maintain a readily deployable force to defend the Island of Taiwan and 
sustain the highest quality military forces that her resources can support. 
A. OPERATIONAL READINESS 
The definition of operational readiness varies with the position and responsibility 
of either the military leader or political leader using the term. In general usage, the 
definition is not used precisely and usually reflects the agenda of the leader employing 
the term. For example, a politician in the legislature may determine that a unit is 
incapable of performing a mission because the military has not purchased a weapon 
system being manufactured in his district. In this case, he has specified the mission that 
he expects the unit to perform in terms of the purchase he wishes the government to 
make. 
What is needed for a better working definition of operational readiness is a 
definition based upon a nation's requirements for its military forces. The ROC military 
forces are required for the ROC to meet its geopolitical obligations that, in turn, dictates 
the missions for the ROC Armed Forces. The missions of the armed forces provide the 
only criterion/context in which to measure the readiness of the military forces to perform 
the tasks that are assigned to it by the ROC Government. 
Any definition of readiness must not only include the capabilities of a unit, either 
in material or personnel, but must be related to a time horizon. For example, some active 
duty Army units are available immediately and may even be in barracks ready for 
immediate deployment. Other units, usually reserve components, are designed to be 
mobilized in periods of six months to a year. In terms of mobilization readiness, each unit 
is still capable of fulfilling its supposed mission; however, the political and military 
leadership must be aware of the constraints represented by the time needed to employ the 
two examples Army units. Looking five to ten years in the future, readiness is more 
concerned with issues of force structure and modernization than with short term 
2 
mobilization. The time frame being considered determines which parameters of readiness 
are of most interest. 
The ROC military structure is a defensive structure and requires an array of units 
like those above to provide for its defense. However, a country wishing to embark upon a 
more aggressive path could plan its military readiness in terms of some longer period, for 
example, a military builds up lasting several years ending in an offensive action planned 
by that country's leadership. Economically, this is a much more efficient system of 
maintaining the military than a defensive military which is required to keep its military in 
a constant high state of readiness to both defend the country and make the country an 
unattractive target both militarily and politically. 
Naturally, the unique situation between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and 
the ROC requires that the ROC very carefully watch any kind of arms build-up in the 
PRC. The PRC has no fear of military confrontation with the ROC, so if the PRC were to 
acquire the capability of invading ROC, the political leadership of the PRC is quite 
capable of carrying that action out, in spite of the obvious repercussions in the 
international community. This means that the PRC has an economic advantage in its 
military build-up. The PRC does not have to maintain forces at a continual high state of 
readiness but is only required to achieve that high state of readiness at a particular point 
in time. The ROC, not being privy to the point in time, must employ its economy to 
maintain a military force that can prevent such an invasion or prevent the leadership of 
the PRC from following that path. In the long term, this may mean that the PRC's 
economy will outperform the ROC's economy because the ROC must, out of necessity, 
divert a significant portion of its resources to its defense structure. 
For the purposes of this study, the readiness that will be addressed is the material 
and training readiness of individual units that make up the armed forces. Naturally, the 
readiness of the ROC to defend itself consists not only of the material readiness of the 
armed forces, but is also dependent upon the ROC's infrastructure and geopolitical 
position in the world. Even though the study will not examine readiness in political terms, 
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the missions that may be assigned to any unit of the armed forces are a direct result of the 
ROC's geopolitical position. In the case of the ROC, this is almost exclusively related to 
opposing an armed invasion by Mainland China. 
B. OBJECT OF THIS RESEARCH 
The area of research for this study is the development of an improved system for 
gauging and reporting the operational readiness of the Republic of China military units. 
In order to develop this system, a study will be made of the existing systems used by 
ROC and the U.S. 
The U.S. uses a system called Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) 
to measure readiness. SORTS is essentially a database that indicates the material and 
training readiness of low level military units at any point in time. The ROC uses an 
inspection system to determine the readiness of the units during scheduled military 
exercises. 
The following research questions are addressed: 
• What are objective measurements for unit readiness? 
• What is lacking in current systems to measure readiness objectively? 
• What systems could be developed to augment the current systems for 
measuring readiness? 
• What system for measuring readiness would best meet the needs of the ROC 
Armed Forces? 
C. METHODOLOGY 
This study involves a review of literature related to military readiness in order to 
assesses the state of the art. The strength and weakness of existing readiness reporting 
systems such as SORTS used in the U.S. military will be examined. Various critiques of 
existing systems and recommendations for improvement will be evaluated for its 
4 
applicability to the ROC Armed Forces and its mission. A proposed readiness 
measurement system for ROC will be developed based on these evaluations. 
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THIS STUDY 
This study will focus on the measurement system that gauges the readiness of 
ROC military units and the management structure of the proposed system. Successful 
implementation of such a system would involve hardware and software development and 
consideration of managerial and behavioral issues. Due to time limitation, this thesis will 
not address the issues related to hardware requirement, software, behavioral 
considerations and what may be needed to implement any recommendations made in the 
study. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF THIS STUDY 
This chapter has been a brief introduction to the ROC's defense situation and 
relevant concepts of military readiness. Chapter II presents a detailed background of the 
ROC's defense strategies for the Island of Taiwan and the ROC's geopolitical position. 
Chapter III addresses the current systems in the U.S. and Taiwan for measuring unit 
readiness. Chapter IV presents a proposal for an automated readiness reporting system to 
address the ROC's defense needs. Chapter V presents conclusions and recommendations. 
5 
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II. THE ROC GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION 
The missions of the Republic of China (ROC) Armed Forces are determined by 
the ROC Government based on the geopolitical conditions of the ROC on Taiwan. The 
ROC Government believes that stable economic growth and democracy is the best 
strategy to provide for the defense of the Island of Taiwan. This strategy dictates that the 
ROC Armed Forces are defensive in nature and their primary mission is maintaining the 
security of the ROC and the freedom of the seas and air space around Taiwan. The most 
likely adversary for the ROC is the People's Republic of China (PRC), or Mainland 
China. 
The ROC Government's position on the issue of reunification with Mainland 
China is that the problem must be solved gradually, peacefully, rationally, equitably, and 
to the mutual benefit of both the Chinese on Taiwan and Mainland China. In contrast, 
Mainland China considers Taiwan to be a Province of China in revolt and the Mainland 
Chinese have never given up the idea of using force to bring about reunification. 
In the following sections, we examine the ROC's most probable adversary, the 
PRC's military forces, in order to identify the missions of the ROC Armed Forces. The 
only likely adversary for the ROC is the PRC. The PRC recognizes the ROC only as a 
rebellious province and has never given up the idea of using force to invade the Island of 
Taiwan. Currently, the ROC has many trade disagreements with the world, but has only 
the PRC as an armed enemy. The defense requirements of the ROC will be examined in 
light of the information realized from examining the PRC military forces. Finally, this 
chapter summarizes the missions for the ROC Armed Forces represented by an armed 
conflict with the ROC's most probable adversary. 
A. THE ROC'S MOST PROBABLE ADVERSARY 
Singapore's former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, is quoted as saying: 
No leadership in China will be able to survive if Taiwan moves away 
and becomes separate. It is too big, too emotional a symbol of national 
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unity. They (PRC) have given a signal to the U. S., Japan, and Taiwan that 
they are prepared to fight. They wanted everyone to know that this is 
important to them. This is not theatrics. It is for real. [Ref. I, p. 57] 
This statement by the former Prime Minister who is one of Asia's most candid leaders, 
gives an insight into the PRC's unwillingness to give up the use of force in reunifying 
Taiwan. The PRC considers the question of Taiwan to be an issue of national survival. In 
fact, there are certain similarities in this attitude with that of the Soviet Union leaders 
when dealing with the Baltic States before the collapse of the Soviet Empire. The leaders 
of the PRC rightly or wrongly believe that an independent Taiwan will lead other 
Provinces of China to want the same freedoms. So when examining the armed forces of 
the PRC, it must be kept in mind that the political leadership of Mainland China 
considers its actions related to Taiwan to be essential to the survival of the PRC. 
1. The PRC Armed Forces 
According to the PRC, the PRC Armed Forces consists of approximately 4.8 
million personnel. Of these personnel, approximately three million are armed forces and 
military reserves, and the remainder are armed police (see Figure 1). 
a. The PRC Army 
The PRC's Armed Forces are distributed in seven military regions and are 
organized into 24 groups. The PRC's equipment includes approximately 12 thousand 
tanks or armored vehicles and approximately 15,000 pieces of towed artillery. 
b. The PRC Navy 
The PRC Navy has a large submarine force of approximately 100 vessels, 
a surface force of 50 ships, 200 missile craft, and approximately 60 amphibious ships. 
Additionally, the PRC Navy has one Marine Brigade and is equipped with approximately 
1,000 aircraft. 
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Figure 1. PRC Armed Forces and Military Districts 
c. The PRC Air Force 
The PRC Air Force consists of 4,000 combat aircraft, 500 transports, and 
200 helicopters. Additionally, the Air Force is assigned a corps-level airborne unit. 
d. The PRC Artillery Force 
The PRC Artillery Force has approximately 100 Intercontinental Ballistic 
Missiles (ICBM) and other shorter range missiles. The PRC has recently acquired 
experience in the development of mobile, medium range solid fuel missiles. [Ref. 2, pp. 
56-57] 
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2. PRC's Political Conduct 
In the last thirty years, the PRC has been in armed conflicts with Russia, India, 
Vietnam, and has invaded some of the islands in the control of the ROC. By invading 
these islands, the PRC has brought itself to a near conflict with the United States. 
Obviously, the PRC believes that it can gain political objectives through the use of force. 
Therefore, the ROC must adopt the attitude that the PRC will use force to reunite China if 
an opportunity presents itself. 
3. The PRC's Strategy 
With a reduction in tensions on the PRC's western borders with the former Soviet 
Union states, one would think that the PRC, like the rest of the world, would be looking 
for a reduction in the cost of military defense, but instead, the PRC has embarked on a 
program of modernizing the PRC Armed Forces and developing a blue-water Navy. 
a. Evolution of the PRC's Strategy 
Until recently, the PRC's defense strategy was based on the concept of a 
people's war. This is a defensive strategy, not dependent on a modem industrial base. The 
intention is to lure the enemy into the country and fight a classic guerrilla war. The Army, 
under this strategy, is the primary military force. This strategy was pursued because the 
PRC cannot maintain the industrial base to support a modem offensive force, and 
because, for most of this period, the PRC was engaged in a border dispute with the Soviet 
Union. Recently, with the resolution of the border dispute, the former Soviet nations can 
once again supply the PRC with up-to-date weapons. 
As .a consequence of the availability of more modem weapons, the PRC 
has shifted its strategy from one of defense to developing the military resources necessary 
to fight limited wars beyond its border. This change of strategy includes strengthening the 
PRC Navy to extend the PRC's influence over its economic. area of the world, and 
conducting joint training operations between its military forces to make them more 
effective offensive forces. 
10 
The PRC has acted very aggressively in dealings with its South China Sea 
neighbor over disputed islands. This is an indication that the Peking Government still 
believes that military force is a primary tool of state. 
b. Increased Defense Spending 
It is impossible to calculate the PRC's defense budget. The PRC military 
forces have commercial resources resulting from the manufacture of weapons for sale 
throughout the world to even the operation of tourist hotels. These enterprises generate 
income used to modernize the PRC military. Additionally, when analyzing the armed 
forces budget, the cost for the supplies and personnel in Mainland China's Armed Forces 
is much lower than in other countries. Therefore, the PRC devotes more of its military 
budget to new hardware than might be the case in an industrial country, whose primary 
budget cost is for personnel. 
In terms of new hardware and equipment, the PRC has increased its 
defense spending. In the last few years, the PRC has manufactured new fighter aircraft, 
produced 17 destroyers, 30 escort vessels that are equipped with helicopters, and armed 
its troops with a variety of tactical nuclear weapons. Most distressing to Taiwan is the 
PRC's development of medium range missiles. 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the PRC has purchased modem 
weapons from the former Soviet states. Additionally, the PRC has been reported to be 
developing cruise missiles, battle tanks, and ASW equipment. [Ref. 2, p. 74] 
c. The PRC's Impact on the Nations of Southeast Asia 
Perhaps the best indication that the expansion and upgrade of the PRC 
military forces is real, is the impact that it has had on the PRC's neighboring nations. The 
fear that the PRC is following an offensive and expansive policy in Asia has resulted in 
an arms build up in· Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia and Vietnam. Many of these 
countries have purchased the most modem weapons in an attempt to offset the greater 
resources of Mainland China. Of particular concern to these nations that, like ROC on 
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Taiwan, are dependent upon foreign trade for their survival is the buildup of the Mainland 
China's Naval forces. These nations wish to prevent Mainland China from affecting their 
foreign policy and economic survival through the use of a blockade or, more probably, 
the threat of a Naval blockade. 
d. Summary 
In summary, the PRC is busily developing a modem, offensive armed 
forces and attempting to ensure its control of the seas near Mainland China. Recent 
missile tests near the Island of Taiwan, are not as most of the world has concluded, 
aberrant behavior of the political leaders in Peking, but rather evidence of Mainland 
China's long-term strategic goal to control the economic zones of Asia. 
B. THE ROC'S DEFENSE NEEDS 
Stable economic growth and democratic processes position the ROC military 
forces as defensive forces. Their purpose is to ensure that force is not used against the 
Island of Taiwan, to safeguard the rights of the people of the ROC, to ensure the 
territorial integrity of the ROC, and to maintain economic prosperity and social stability 
in the ROC. These are the goals of any democratic nation and do not primarily constitute 
an offensive strategy. Like all democracies, the ROC has no designs on its neighbors' 
territories and believes that problems of that nature may best be solved through 
negotiation and compromise. 
Like most of the nations in the post cold war period, the ROC wishes to develop a 
less costly, more capable and higher quality armed forces for its defense. To do this, the 
ROC has identified its military needs as almost exclusively the defense of the Island of 
Taiwan and the areas under the control of the ROC. This defense is obviously directed 
against an armed invasion by Mainland China. 
1. The ROC's Strategy 
The long-term strategy of the ROC relies on the strength of the nation's economy 
and its corresponding political position in world commerce to establish a foundation that 
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will lead to peaceful resolutions to the problems between the ROC and Mainland China. 
The ROC Government believes the long-term economic strength of the ROC can offset 
the much greater resources of Mainland China. 
A key part of this strategy is a military force that is well-disciplined, well-
organized and has a strong commitment to tradition. This military force must be highly 
qualified and effective in the realities of budgetary constraints of the post cold war world. 
2. Missions ofthe ROC's Armed Forces 
The missions of the ROC's Armed Forces can be divided into three broad 
categories. These categories are based on a scenario of an invasion of ROC controlled 
territory by the PRC. 
a. Control of the Air 
In order to defend against an invasion, the ROC must have control of its 
airspace, and also have a credible offense for attacking invading forces. Recently, the 
ROC has purchased F-16 fighters for the purpose of denying its airspace to an enemy. 
Additionally, the ROC has th~ following strategies to ensure control of the airspace: 
• Replace aging aircraft with aircraft acquired abroad (F -16) or aircraft acquired 
locally. 
• Purchase an airborne early warning system for the control of defensive aircraft 
and for warning of an impending attack. 
• Modernize the surface to air missile systems by integrating their command 
and control into an integrated air system for the ROC. 
• Purchase additional transport aircraft for resupplying and reinforcing the 
outlying territories of the ROC. 
The above list of material requirements for the defense of the ROC also 
dictates a list of training requirements for the operation and maintenance of this 
equipment. Because the ROC Armed Forces are defensive in nature, in order for this 
equipment to be available in time of war, it is used continuously in time of peace for the 
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training of personnel. In order to ensure that the equipment is ready to perform its 
mission, the ROC requires continuous monitoring of its material condition. Additionally, 
a system must be developed to continuously monitor the training of the personnel 
expected to operate this modem equipment. 
b. Control of the Sea 
The Island of Taiwan is the base for the ROC's defense of its territory. 
Like any island nation, the ROC must control the seas around it. Without this control, 
these same seas become a highway for its adversaries. Throughout history, land based 
nations that have depended primarily upon their Army for political and strategic power 
and have found themselves completely barred from further conquests by very small 
stretches of ocean. This is always true when the defending country has a strong Navy. 
The tendency in the modem world is to believe that aircraft have forded this defense. In 
the Gulf War the United States, which has the largest transportation capability in the 
world, was still restricted to moving the majority of its material via ships. Large amounts 
of material simply cannot be moved with aircraft. In order to upgrade its Navy and ensure 
control of the seas around the Island of Taiwan, the ROC has the following strategies: 
• Build second generation combat ships, for example, missile frigates, missile 
patrol frigates and coastal patrol vessels. 
• Leasing Knox-class frigates from the United States to increase its deep water 
capabilities. 
• Purchase submarines and shore-based anti-ship missiles to enhance its 
counter-blockade capabilities. 
• Develop command and control systems for the better coordination of its forces 
and to increase its anti-submarine warfare capabilities. 
Like the Air Force, the Navy must track its material readiness and the training of its 
personnel to maintain a high state of readiness that will deter an attempted invasion from 
Mainland China. Additionally, the Navy is responsible for the protection of the economic 
lifeline of the ROC which is trade with other nations of the world. Even if ROC were to 
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become a center for the production of intellectual property and basic research, the ROC 
would still depend upon bulk carriers for oil and food. 
c. Land Defense 
When sea and air defenses do not completely stop an enemy's advance, a 
nation must depend upon its Army for its defense and survival. The ROC Army is 
responsible for stopping an invasion on the beaches of the territory controlled by the 
ROC. A modem Army depends upon mobility, communication and coordination to make 
up for its reduced numbers from the Armies of the past. Modem soldiers are versed in the 
use of many types of equipment needed for modem warfare. Although not as materially 
dependent as Air Force and Navy, the mobility aspect of modem warfare means that the 
Army must maintain many pieces of equipment such as trucks, vehicles, artillery pieces, 
helicopters, etc. Armies also maintain warehouses of equipment needed to equip reserve 
forces in the event of a conflict. The readiness of all of this equipment must be tracked to 
ensure that the ROC Armed Forces are capable of performing their mission. 
3. Material and Training Readiness of the ROC Armed Forces 
Offensive forces that have the advantage of initiating a conflict also have the 
advantage of preparing and planning their offensive operation. Defensive forces like the 
ROC Armed Forces must remain in a high state of readiness in order to discourage 
attacks from a potential enemy. This high state of readiness serves both a military and a 
political purpose. In the political arena, it allows a country to pursue its political goals 
and economic functions without the interference of belligerent neighbors. In the military 
area, the high state of readiness ensures that the planned use of military force is in 
accordance with the actual capabilities of those units. 
a. Material Readiness 
Material readiness is the availability of equipment and supplies that a unit 
may require to perform a mission assigned to it. This perhaps is the easiest aspect of 
readiness to measure. For example, if a unit has so many pieces of propelled artillery and 
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a certain percentage of that artillery was not mobile, then the unit's readiness, at least in 
the material sense, can be measured by how many pieces of equipment are functional for 
the mission assigned divided by the number of pieces of equipment assigned to the unit. 
Generally, systems that measure the readiness of units are overly dependent on the 
statistics gathered for material readiness.[Ref. 3, p. 3] 
(1) New Weapons Systems. New weapons systems present 
unique problems for ROC Armed Forces in the measurement of material readiness. New 
weapons systems that have not been employed by armed forces do not have a database 
from which their reliability, availability and effectiveness can be gauged. Existing 
weapons systems where there is experience in their repair and usage have this database 
and additionally, have experienced personnel available to train others in their repair and 
operation. Some countries, although very willing to sell the actual hardware for a new 
weapons system, are unwilling to provide the expertise in its use and maintenance. 
(2) Existing Weapons Systems. Existing weapons systems have 
the opposite problem as newly deployed weapons systems. There are usually large 
amounts of data and experience in their use and maintenance, but in the case of the ROC 
these systems are purchased or leased from a country where this data is not supplied. 
Additionally, old weapons systems may employ parts that have gone out of production 
and local manufacturers may be required to retool for the production of these obsolete 
parts. This type of manufacture is particularly expensive when dealing with weapons 
systems. Weapons systems are not economically produced in their initial manufacture and 
a retooling operation for the production of obsolete short run parts can become 
prohibitively expensive. The ROC has leased large numbers of frigates from the United 
States that fall into this category. 
b. Training Readiness 
No matter what material a unit has access to, the unit will not be able to 
use the material assigned without trained people to operate and repair modem military 
equipment. In the Gulf War, the allies military effectiveness was much greater due to the 
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high technology available to allied forces. However, what is often overlooked is that 
these forces must be well trained to use that equipment in order to be effective. In the 
case of the ROC, training will be very important for the development of a high quality 
military force to offset the obvious material advantages of the PRC. 
c. Summary 
The defensive forces of the ROC must have a reliable and accurate 
measure of the readiness of the military units of the ROC to perform the missions 
assigned to those units. In order for the ROC strategy of a deterrent defense to work, the 
ROC Armed Forces must present a modern and credible defense. It is very expensive to 
maintain a military force at a high state of readiness. Also, this high state of readiness is 
sometimes counter-productive in that units that are available and ready at the time before 
an attack, may actually be in a declined state of readiness at the time of the attack. So, in 
addition to measuring the readiness of various units, this system must also provide a 
means for the Commanders and the political authority to manage the readiness of the 
armed forces unit. 
C. SUMMARY 
This chapter has presented an overview of the strategies of both the ROC and its 
most probable adversary the PRC. These strategies lead directly to the mission 
requirements of the respective countries armed forces. In the case of the PRC, these 
missions seem to be directed at an invasion or embargo of the Island of Taiwan and the 
ROC. In the case of the ROC, the primary strategies are to prevent an attack by the PRC. 
By presenting a credible defense and maintaining economic strength, the ROC can offset 
the obvious material advantages of Mainland China. 
The missions and strategies of the ROC lead to the need for high material and 
training readiness for the ROC Armed Forces. The measurement of this readiness is an 
integral element of the defense of the Island of Taiwan and requires a reliable and 
accurate system. In the next chapter, we present the current readiness measurement 
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systems used in the United States and ROC, and address some of the shortcomings of 
these systems. 
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III. READINESS MEASUREMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICES 
The first part of this chapter presents an overview of the term military readiness 
and the several definitions used by the military and the political leadership. These 
definitions constitute what is intended to be measured by the two systems used in the 
U.S. and the ROC. The second part of the chapter presents the current system used by the 
U.S., Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS). The third part of the chapter 
presents the system used in the ROC which is based on a rotating command inspection 
process. The final section is a review of the system and presents some of the 
shortcomings and advantages of the U.S. and the ROC system for measuring readiness. 
A. READINESS 
A good measure of readiness is required in both peacetime and political crisis. In 
peacetime, a credible military force can prevent war and be used by a country in its 
international relationships. In wartime or a crisis when the military forces of the country 
may be called on for its defense, almost every country in the world would find its military 
forces willing to defend their homeland. However, readiness is not a question of a willing 
military, but a question of the capability of the military force. In the following section, a 
definition of readiness is developed. This definition will give some insight into how 
readiness can be measured. [Ref. 4, p. 27] 
1. Definitions 
To define readiness in terms which can be measured, it is necessary to first review 
what various leaders mean when they use the term readiness. For a military leader, the 
term is a technical word which means the capability of a unit to perform an assigned 
function. This definition implies not only the capacity to perform the task, but also the 
ability to deploy, and sustain a commitment to the task over a period of time. A political 
leader uses readiness to mean the effectiveness of a military force either in war or as a 
deterrent to war. This study does not address the political definition of readiness. 
Readiness in the political arena is a very loosely defined term. However, a country's 
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population bases its evaluation of its military forces readiness on the expressions of both 
its military and political leadership. In this study, readiness will be based on the concept 
of the capability of a force and the unit's ability to achieve a capacity in a period of time. 
However, another view of readiness is that readiness is the capacity to perform a defined 
mission. This is the output definition of readiness. The two systems presented in this 
chapter, use the input view of readiness which is based on the first definition. 
a. Capacity 
A military unit's capacity is a combination of its training and the state of 
the equipment assigned to the unit. Military units are designed for the performance of 
specific tasks and these tasks are reflected in the unit's training. All military units are 
assumed to have a basic level of training which is augmented by training for performing a 
specific function. [Ref. 4, p 27] 
The easiest measure of capacity is the readiness of equipment assigned to 
the unit. This can generally be done through supply statistics and maintenance data. The 
training of a military unit is either performed by the unit itself or via the pipeline for 
transferring personnel from unit to unit. Generally, combat units training is measured as a 
function of the unit's exercises. This information can be augmented by determining the 
number of new personnel assigned to that unit. 
A military commander must base his opinion on a unit's readiness not only on the 
ability to move the unit to the area of conflict, but also on the ability of the unit to be 
successful in performing its tasks after it is deployed. 
b. Speed 
It is impossible to keep high quality military units at peak readiness for the 
same reason that it is impossible for athletes to remain at peak readiness throughout their 
training. For athletes their goal is to obtain peak readiness at the moment of a race. For a 
military unit, the goal is peak readiness at the moment of combat. If a country had the 
resources and manpower, it could maintain enough units at the peak of readiness for any 
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probable conflict. In the real world, this would be prohibitively expensive or require a 
political system that is at the extremes of authoritarianism. In the world today, the only 
regime that fits this description is North Korea. Most other countries cycle their military 
units through a series of high readiness and lower readiness periods. Any readiness 
measurement system must account for the cycles to be useful. In the ideal world, the 
political and military leadership could determine the moment and time when their forces 
would be required to be at a high state of readiness. In the case of the ROC and the PRC, 
only the offensive operation of the PRC will allow the PRC to be at peak readiness. This 
has an economic effect in addition to a military effect. The economic effect is that the 
ROC must maintain a high state of readiness in defense of a possible invasion or embargo 
from the PRC. 
2. Readiness Above the Unit Level 
The real problem with measuring readiness is not the measurement of a unit's 
capability but measuring the readiness of combined units to perform a particular military 
mission. For a single unit, measurements of training, the status of equipment, the 
qualification status of its personnel, its maintenance and supply support would produce a 
quantitative figure that would represent the unit's ability to perform a specific mission. 
Of course, these measurements would have to be made in light of the mission to be 
assigned to the unit. For larger units, the combined capabilities and resource requirements 
produce interrelationships that number in the multi-millions. Problems of this type are 
awaiting discoveries in graph theory to reduce them to manageable size. [Ref. 5, p. 13] 
3. Operational Readiness, Speed and Efficiency 
Operational readiness is readiness related to the efficiency of a unit in combat and 
the time that it takes to deploy the unit. Operational readiness usually refers to specific 
capabilities of the unit, personnel and material. [Ref. 4, p. 40] 
Operational readiness is a measure of how quickly a unit can be brought to peak 
capability. This is a measure of the potential of the unit not its actual capability. 
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Another aspect of operational readiness is the efficiency of the unit. This again 
only measures its potential efficiency. The combination of speed and efficiency is 
operational readiness which is a measure of how quickly a unit can be brought to peak 
readiness and how efficiently the unit may fight. [Ref. 4, p. 40] The difficulty with this 
measurement is that although it measures the potential capability of a unit, it cannot 
indicate a unit's ability to successfully accomplish a particular mission. It is difficult to 
use operational readiness for an array of units at different levels of readiness to draw 
conclusions as to whether or not the array of units would be successful. Operational 
readiness as it is normally used, will only indicate a unit's ability to perform its most 
difficult mission in an ideal setting of supply and maintenance support. [Ref. 4, p. 41] 
4. Structural Readiness, Speed and Mass 
Structural readiness deals with multiple units. Its definition is how quickly a 
force of the necessary size can be in place to perform a mission. Structural readiness also 
is a measure of potential, not actual, capability. Structural readiness does not include 
efficiency. When examining a table in Jane's Weekly Defense, what the reader sees is 
structural readiness. The reader cannot know the capabilities or experience of the forces 
described in the table. There is no indication of the time required to bring these forces to a 
useful level of readiness. [Ref. 4, p. 41] 
5. Mobilization 
MoBilization is a concept which ties operational and structural readiness together. 
A larger force better equipped but requiring a longer period of time to mobilize may be 
defeated by a much smaller force able to deploy immediately. However, given time, the 
situation would be reversed. 
Mobilization has significant economic impact on nations. If a nation has ten years 
to prepare for war it can be expected to do that with economic efficiency and to delay 
peak readiness for that period of time. This would bring significant economic rewards to 
the civilian economy for the preceding period when it was not necessary to maintain a 
military force. This is a case of the British planning prior to World War I. In contrast the 
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U.S. during the cold war was required to maintain forces for instant retaliation of an 
nuclear attack from the Soviet Union. This is very expensive economically. Units must 
operate as if they are at war using resources that are drawn directly from the civilian 
economy. [Ref. 4, pp. 53-59] 
Besides the obvious economic effect as a drain on economy, there is the long-term 
effect of a lower investment rate over time which results in an economy not as strong as 
would have been the case if the investment had been made in the civilian sector. This 
leads to a nation which is not as strong as it would have been at the beginning of the 
crisis. This has an interesting parallel in the current situation between the ROC and the 
PRC., merely by threatening to use force against the ROC, the PRC can gain an economic 
advantage. 
6. Summary 
In summary, a measurement of readiness requires several scales. The first scale 
and the easiest to visualize is the training and material readiness of individual units. The 
second scale is the capacity of these units as groups or in the aggregate. This would be a 
very difficult scale to develop because of the large number of inter-relationships 
represented by various military units of different capacities. The next factor which must 
be included in any measurement is time. Units which must be ready at a moment's notice 
are in no higher state of readiness than units which are intended to be mobilized over a 
longer period of time. However, economically, the units that will mobilize are less 
expensive in resources and hence, can represent a larger mass in terms of structural 
readiness. Finally, all measurements of readiness must be related to a mission 
requirement. This presents the difficulty that a unit rated at a very low readiness for its 
primary mission, may in fact be fully capable of performing some other mission for 
which it would be rated at a very high level. The literature indicates that the current 
systems for measuring readiness are input driven, or driven by the capacity of the unit 
when in fact a better system may be output driven in the sense of identifying the readiness 
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of the unit in terms of mission requirements. The next section is a discussion of the U.S. 
method of measuring readiness. 
B. U.S. READINESS MEASUREMENT SYSTEM 
The U.S. measures the readiness of its military units in a variety of ways, war 
games, training exercises, inspections, and reports. However, for the purposes of the 
military and civilian leadership, the U.S. has developed Status of Resources and Training 
Systems (SORTS). This section is a brief review of the SORTS and a summary of its 
strengths and weaknesses for measuring the readiness of individual and higher level units. 
1. SORTS 
SORTS is a minor modification of a previous system, the Unit Status and Identity 
Report (UNITREP). This system was modified to include training and resources. [Ref. 6, 
p. 10] In the SORT system, a unit's status is reported in a coding system consisting ofC-
1 to C-5. C-1 is the most capable unit and C-5 are units in overhaul or some other major 
reorganization that does not allow them to be used in combat. Table 1 shows the criteria 
used to determine a unit's category or C level. In Table 1, training is purely a subjective 
measurement based on the commanding officer's assessment. For other items, personnel, 
equipment and supply and equipment condition, the ratings vary from service to service 
depending on criteria developed by each individual service. Reports are made within 24-
hours of a unit changing status. Reports are made within the chain of command until the 
level of a major unit is reached where they are entered into the joint staff database. [Ref. 
6, p. 10] A unit's status is based on approved Operational Plan (OPLANs) developed by 
the Joint Chief-of-Staff. 
2. Strengths and Weaknesses 
The major strength of this system is that it has evolved from a previous system 
and the structure and methods used to support it are well integrated into the chain-of-
command. Personnel who deal with readiness at high levels have been trained and have 
acquired experience over their careers that allow them to interpret the data received. 
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Personnela Equipment & Equipment Training d 
Supplies b Conditionb,c 
C-1 Total 90 Combat 90 Combat 90 Completed 85 
MOS 85 Aircraft 90 Aircraft 75 Oprtnl Crews 85 
Grade 85 Other 90 End-Items 90 No. days Required 14 
C-2 Total 80 Combat 80 Combat 70 Completed 70 
MOS 75 Aircraft 80 Aircraft 60 Oprtnl Crews 70 
Grade 75 Other 80 End-Items 70 No. days Required 28 
C-3 Total 70 Combat 65 Combat 60 Completed 55 
MOS 65 Aircraft 60 Aircraft 50 Oprtnl Crews 55 
Grade 65 Other 65 End-Items 60 No. days Required 42 
C-4 Lower Lower Lower Lower or longer 
C-5 "Unit not prepared, undergoing service-directed resource action" 
SOURCE: JCS, 1986c. 
a The percentage fill by pay grade may be used optionally. 
b The services provide supplemental methods for measuring the status of unique equipment (such 
as Air Force mobile communications equipment and navigation aids) that is unsuited for 
measurement by percentages. 
c Equipment must be fully operational within the mission or alert response time or 72 hours, 
whichever is shorter. 
d Each service designates one method of reporting training status for each type of unit. 
(Thresholds, percentages of prescribed wartime requirements) 
Table 1. Criteria for Sorts Resource Category C-Levels 
From [Ref. 6, p. 12] 
The drawbacks of this system are many. The most important drawback is that the 
system is based on scenarios for combat operations which themselves are based on the 
capability of individual combat units. The measurement of readiness is intended to 
measure the capability of a combat unit. Therefore, this system is somewhat circular in 
definition, a unit's capability is rated based on a military opinion of the unit's normal 
capability in an operation. At the other end of the system a military analyst determines 
whether the unit is at its optimum capacity. Essentially, a military analyst has defined the 
optimum capacity of a unit and then measured every unit in terms of his definition. 
However, in the military every unit has a commander who is quite capable of performing 
this analysis and a much simpler system would be just to require each commander to 
report his unit's availability for combat. 
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SORTS itself is a database which is characterized as a snapshot of military 
readiness at a point in time. Even that description is misleading because the snapshot is of 
a number of units' readiness over a time period represented by their reporting 
requirements. So, SORTS is much more like an out-of-focus picture. [Ref. 6, p. 11] 
The SORTS rating system is based on the idea that the unit goal is to achieve 
readiness of C-1 or combat capable. A much clearer view of readiness is that readiness is 
a cycle where units go in and out of peak readiness to conserve budget, personnel and 
ensure that the nation will have enough units at peak readiness for its defense. 
A military operation directed by military or civilian leaders, must include many 
more things than just the readiness of an individual unit. For example, a battalion of 
infantry must be moved to a place supported by a supply chain that will allow them to 
remain in combat for the required period. If the problem were only to move a single unit, 
then the resources to support and supply the unit could be simply determined, but when 
hundreds of units are moved, resources rated as combat ready may not be able to support 
hundreds of units. To prevent something like that happening, it is necessary to be 
extremely careful in describing the possible missions that the combat unit is to perform. 
However, the SORTS rating system is oriented around a unit's readiness, not around the 
resources required to perform the mission. This problem is described in the literature as 
only monitoring inputs or a unit's capability. What is required is to monitor outputs or 
missions and then to assess a unit's capability of performing those missions. [Ref. 6, p. 
14] 
3. GAO Report on Military Readiness 
In 1994 the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) produced a report evaluating 
SORTS. The GAO found that the current systems for measuring readiness do not measure 
certain key elements of a unit's readiness. Figure 2 contains a chart ofthese key elements. 
The gray areas represent types of information that SORTS does measure. Ofthese items, 
training is a subjective measurement and other items are simple inventory processes. The 
other items in the chart are items that commanders would like to consider when 
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measuring the readiness of units. This report listed 650 indicators for measuring readiness 
and described that the individual services used those indicators to augment the SORTS 
data. However, the report is still input oriented and in summary, is an attempt to repair an 
existing system, rather than produce a system which will measure the readiness of units 
related to the missions that may be assigned. Even if SORTS were modified to measure 
650 indicators, it would still be a system designed to maintain all units at a high level of 
readiness for their primary mission. Naturally this would increase the cost of gathering 
readiness information. What is required is an output oriented system which measures a 
unit's readiness in relation to the missions it might be assigned. [Ref. 7, p. 3] 
Figure 2. Factors Important for Readiness Assessment 
After [Ref. 7, p. 3] 
4. Logistics Support 
Training 
The U.S. uses a sustainability measurement system related to the Operational Plan 
(OPLANs) and to sustain deployed units in combat. This system uses an S-rating 
somewhat analogous to the C-rating. Table 2 shows the criteria that the rating is based on. 
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This rating is for propositioned equipment that may be required for combat based on the 
scenarios in the OPLAN. The shortcomings of this S-rating are related to the 
shortcomings of the military supply system in that the parts or material required for the 
support of an operation is not really a hard number. In a wartime situation, this 
experience may or may not provide adequate support. Additionally, these ratings are 
based on the most demanding scenarios and may lead to inefficiencies when less 
demanding operations are required. [Ref. 6, p. 18] 
Sustainability Rating Percentage of Pre-positioning 
DOS Objective Available3 
S-1 90-100 
S-2 75-80 
S-3 50-74 
S-4 0-49 
SOURCE: JCS, 1986b. 
aFor supply classes I (rations) and III (fuels, lubricants), the S-rating 
is determined by percentage of fill. For exa111ple, 78 percent of 
required rations dictates an S-2 rating. For other supply classes (11-
individual equipment, IV-construction materials, V-ammunition, VI-
personal items, VII-major end-items, VIII-medical supplies, IX-
repair parts), the aggregate rating is taken as the S-rating containing 
the 90th percentile of constituent line items' S-ratings. For example, 
if 50 percent of the items in the class are S-1, 30 percent are S-2, 15 
percent are S-3, and 5 percent are S-4, then the aggregate S-rating 
would be S-3. 
Table 2. Criteria for Military Capability Report 
Sustainability Ratings 
From [Ref. 6, p. 19] 
5. Summary 
In the engineering world, a cardinal rule is to throw away the first design. The 
reasoning behind this rule is that the initial design is used to teach the designer the 
detailed requirements of a working system. Further, the designer's initial vision of what a 
working system would be like, may contaminate the design process to such a degree that 
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the first design may be flawed. In the case of the ROC, the U.S. has provided the first 
design which demonstrates the requirements of measuring readiness. 
Fixing the flaws in the first design would lead to a patchwork system and an 
unsatisfactory result. The reasons for this are that these are large bureaucratic systems 
which have adapted the information gathered for SORTS for their own purposes. Any 
additional reporting responsibilities placed on these organizations will inevitably be 
grafted onto already Byzantine-like procedures and processes. Although many 
organizations ask for new information from their subordinates, it is a. rare event when an 
organization announces that it no longer needs a report or data. What would happen in the 
redesign, is that the organization directly concerned with SORTS would be modified but 
the many organizations reporting would end up with two systems, the old and the new. 
This would not only happen at the levels directly reporting to the SORTS but would take 
place at every level of the system until it reached the very lowest levels where the 
information is developed from maintenance, personnel and supply reports. 
The next section addresses the system used by the ROC to measure the readiness 
of its military forces. 
C. ROC'S READINESS MEASUREMENT SYSTEM 
The ROC's readiness tracking system consists of various military exercises, 
depending upon the level of the unit being tested. At the very lowest level, units are 
tested twice a year in the field. This test results in a grade representing the readiness or 
capabilities of that unit. At higher levels, larger units participate in war games in an 
exercise area. There are serious penalties in this war game for losing. This is intended to 
motivate units to be innovative and be at the highest level of readiness. 
1. Advantages and Disadvantages of the System 
In reality the ROC has the same readiness tracking system as the Roman Empire. 
This system is essentially a drill system where each individual is trained to perform his 
job by doing the job. The intention is to train the individual to the point where he can do 
the job in the most horrendous of circumstances, essentially without thinking about it. 
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This is the basis of all military training; however, in the modem world this may make a 
unit less effective and flexible. 
Training for units is an ongoing process. Every unit is, in fact, training for the 
next inspection and every combined unit at a higher level is preparing for the next war 
game. The disadvantage of this system is that only the opinions of the commanders and 
umpires of the war games "measure" the capacity of the units. The advantages of this 
system is that it does not require a great deal of bureaucracy to track readiness. The ROC 
is able to use this system because the ROC's missions for its military are very limited, 
preventing an invasion and protecting its sealanes. 
2. Process 
The effect of this measurement system is that units which are found to be below a 
minimum capacity are cycled back through advanced training and retested to ensure that 
they meet the minimum requirements for readiness. This retraining effectively returns the 
unit to a high readiness status. An additional incentive for the officer corps is that if a unit 
maintains a 95 percent score, the officers in the unit are rewarded with a pay incentive. 
The system does not punish personnel below the officer level for a poor readiness rating, 
however, if a unit does not meet an acceptable level, the commanding officer will be 
relieved in time. 
3. Logistics Support 
The logistics system ofthe ROC is based on the U.S. system. The U.S. system is 
intended to meet the needs of armed forces deployed throughout the world. The ROC 
requirements are for a defensive operation near the Island of Taiwan. Recently, the ROC 
has reconfigured its logistics support to better meet the needs of a defensive force. The 
ROC has given control of supply support and maintenance to regional commanders. 
a. Support by Combat Zone 
The ROC has moved logistic support from the force level to the tactical 
level for units that defend certain zones. By doing this, supply and maintenance support is 
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under the control of a local commander which should shorten the process and increase 
efficiency for the support of that commander's units. 
b. Maintenance System 
The ROC has separated maintenance functions from combat units. What 
this accomplishes is a more efficient maintenance and supply operation. Previously, every 
combat unit maintained a maintenance organization even though it was duplicated 
throughout the combat force. This is a characteristic of an offensive force because units 
advancing in the field may be required to separate from the main force and therefore must 
have all of the capabilities of the force. In a defensive military, the military unit is 
defending an area and can share maintenance and supply resources. 
c. Weapons Systems 
The ROC is equipped with a variety of weapons systems imported from 
many nations. Recently, the ROC has followed a policy of ensuring that these weapons 
systems no matter how much potential a system may have from a military point of view, 
it will not be deployed if it cannot be supported by units in the field and used in a 
sustained defense of the island. Operationally, the ROC intends to establish a logistics 
system that can support any new weapons system before that weapons system is 
considered operational. 
d. Overall Program 
The ROC has embarked on a program to refashion its logistics support for 
a modem force by adopting automated processing systems and removing obsolete parts 
and inventory from the existing system. Additionally, the ROC is retiring many weapons 
systems that are obsolete in order to arrive at the minimum mixture of useful systems that 
may be supported. 
4. Summary 
In summary, the ROC does not have a readiness measurement system for tracking 
modem equipment and maintaining units at various levels of readiness dependent upon 
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time and mobilization requirements. The ROC simply maintains every unit at a defined 
proficiency and capacity. The ROC also tests these units to ensure that they have 
maintained their proficiency. This is expensive in terms of personnel and resources. A 
system to track readiness would allow the ROC to maintain a highly capable military 
more efficiently. In the future, it can be expected that the legislative body of the ROC will 
demand a more efficient defense sector and some readiness measurement system will be 
necessary to justify the budget and direction of the defense establishment. 
D. IMPROVEMENTS 
The preceding information on both the U.S. system and the ROC's system of 
readiness measurement suggest improvements to the U.S. system and a possible system 
based on SORTS for the ROC. In Reference 11, S. Craig Moore and et a/. make 
suggestions for improvement of the SORTS. These suggestions are a good starting point 
for the design of a system which augment SORTS for the ROC. [Ref. 6, pp. 6-9] The 
following suggested targets for improvement are related to military units at the lowest 
levels: 
• Asset Reporting: Improve the consistency of reporting on quantities and 
conditions of equipment, personnel, supplies. Include in this reporting system 
measures related to time to achieve particular measurement levels or stock 
levels. 
• Unit Modeling: Simulate missions using specific resource sets. Develop 
modeling for the interdependency of units. Develop data sources to streamline 
the modeling process. 
• Functional Testing: Functional tests or exercises should be performed on 
short notice with as much realism as is practical. Evaluations should be 
performed by groups independent of the evaluated units and forces. 
The following list of suggested targets for improvement have to do with the readiness of 
forces or multiple units: 
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• Stockpile Reporting: Develop a system which reports the condition and 
quantities of stock which are not under the control of individual units. This 
should be done in reference to mission planning and probable mission 
scenarios. This would allow the military commanders to better estimate the 
resources available to a large force. 
• Mobilization Planning: Mobilization planning should be improved to include 
the time necessary to mobilize units and training them to combat ready 
condition. There should be more accuracy in the measurement of resources 
that may be utilized from the civilian industrial sector. 
• Deployment Distribution Planning: Broaden the scope of analysis to include 
more detail on the movement, deployment and resource utilization and source 
of forces and units. Particular attention should be paid to the efficiency of 
transportation of units versus the utilization of units already deployed. 
• Combat Modeling and Wargaming: Wargaming models should include 
readiness and sustainability factors. Better representation of logistics and 
manpower constraints should be incorporated in these training systems. 
These modifications can be performed piecemeal and would lead to a general 
improvement of the SORT system. A large number of these suggestions include the 
collection of data either new information or the redesign of old information. Most of 
these systems are intended for a different purpose. For example, the supply system 
collects data for the purpose of accounting and anticipating demand. For the SORTS to 
use this data it would have to be intercepted at its source before it was processed by 
supply. This implies a separate database system maintained by SORTS. Also, it implies 
separate analysis of this data. 
E. SUMMARY 
In the current environment of downsizing military establishments and the 
requirements placed on the military by the political leadership to have highly qualified 
military units at the lowest economical cost possible, readiness is a required measurement 
not only for the purposes of determining the capabilities of military forces, but for 
determining the direction of budget and resources of a nation. 
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The ROC is in an unenviable position of having no formal system for measuring 
the readiness of its military forces in the modem sense. This should make it possible for 
the ROC to establish a system which fulfills its needs without the burden of a design 
based on previous readiness measurement systems. 
The next chapter addresses the elements required to measure military readiness 
and suggests a methodology to perform that function. 
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IV. AUTOMATED READINESS MEASUREMENT SYSTEM 
One of the problems with the measurement of readiness is its political nature. 
Political and military leaders can use the numbers generated by any system for their own 
purposes. However, the purpose of a readiness system is to improve and maintain the 
defense of a nation. Decisions made on either inflated or deflated readiness information 
have significant long-term effects on the defense of the country and its treasury. To 
illustrate this, Lawrence J. Korb, who was the "readiness czar" of the Reagan 
Administration, relates that during the Reagan Administration the readiness figures for 
all the services were going down, even though the U.S. was spending more money on 
defense. Interestingly enough, what was really happening was the military leadership was 
raising the criteria used to measure readiness at a greater speed than the Reagan 
Administration was investing money to improve readiness. [Ref. 8, p. 40]. 
The measurement of readiness requires a system that has some analytical basis. 
Without that base, the political and military leadership will, for the best of reasons, 
manipulate the system to achieve their own agendas. This chapter presents a proposal for 
an automated system to measure military readiness. Such a system would be a major 
undertaking and require a large amount of resources. However, the consequences of a 
nation maintaining an unnecessarily high readiness state for long periods would far 
outweigh an investment in a system to measure readiness. For example, the U.S. 
maintained an instant readiness to go to war for 40 years. The war never took place and 
some historians believe that the U.S. maintained far more force than was necessary to 
discourage a Soviet adventure. 
The following section discusses the functions that must be performed for the 
measurement of readiness. 
A. READINESS ANALYSIS 
This section addresses an analysis of measurement of readiness for a unit 
assuming that it will be accomplished in a manual system. All large organizations, 
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military or civilian, employ the normal array of analysis techniques in their day-to-day 
operations such as decision tables, optimization models, information algebra, activity 
analysis, operational analysis, PERT charts, and resource analysis. Most of these 
techniques have their origin from the 1920 processes of flow charts, linear algebra, 
probability theory, truth tables, scheduling charts, modem accounting theory, right and 
left hand analyst charts, and stop watch studies. [Ref. 9] 
1. Military Analysis 
In the military arena, a military operation is planned with the intent of providing 
for every possibility or contingency that might arise. In the previous chapter, one of the 
conclusions is that current readiness systems used in the U.S. are input oriented when in 
fact, a better system would be output oriented. That is to say the readiness system should 
measure the readiness of a unit in terms of the unit's contribution to a defined mission. 
What this would mean in an analysis is that the analyst would first determine the military 
requirements for a mission and then would attempt to identify the units that had the 
capacity to fill those requirements. This completely eliminates the threshold problem with 
measuring readiness. A unit would be thought of as having a continuous capability from 
"not combat capable" to "fully capable" to perform this particular operation as opposed to 
current systems, where the unit would proceed from plateau to plateau in discrete steps. 
These discrete steps are misleading because the unit that may be able to perform its 
mission is one day away from fully operational but the traditional measurement system 
treats the unit as if it had just entered its current status. 
2. Process 
The process in this study of readiness is assumed to be an analysis of a mission 
with the purpose of determining a unit's readiness to participate in that specific mission. 
The reason for this assumption is that the problem with current readiness measurement 
systems is that they make no provisions for units which are not 100 percent ready for 
combat. In the real world a nation cannot afford to ignore any of its military assets or 
afford to finance a 1 00 percent ready force. 
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3. Mission 
The first task of the analyst would be to determine the requirements for 
performing a mission identified by the military and political leadership. To accomplish 
this, the analyst would make use of historical data and exercise data to determine the units 
necessary to accomplish the task and the resources necessary to support the task. 
Additionally, the analyst must determine the transportation requirements, communication 
resources available, and the supply support available. In order to do this, the analysis of 
the mission has to be approached in a context of the political situation when the mission 
would be required. A peacetime mission meant to reinforce the sovereignty of a country 
could expect to have access to all of the nation's resources. A wartime mission would be 
in competition for resources with other equally important missions. 
One of the difficulties with the SORTS is it does not account for multiple units 
competing for the same resources. In peacetime for example, a medical unit could expect 
to have a full complement of doctors, but in wartime, they would be in short supply and 
they cannot be manufactured at a higher rate to make up for the shortage. 
The next step for the analyst would be to consider all the factors for a particular 
mission and develop the task necessary for successfully completing that mission. Figure 3 
is an illustration of the factors considered for the development of a wargame. This model 
was developed in the 1980s and has been used by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff as a 
planning aid for real world contingencies. As can be seen by the individual items in the 
model, the analysis would require a team of people each with specialized experience in 
their areas of military operation led by an analyst who would have to be an experienced 
military expert familiar with all aspects of the mission, including logistic requirements, 
technology, and political science. 
At the conclusion of this analysis, the analyst will have a list of requirements for 
the successful performance of this mission. If the analysis is carefully done, the analyst 
may discover as the U.S. did in the late 1960s in an exercise designed to move a large 
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unit to Europe that not only were there too few railroad flatcars too move the unit's tanks 
to a port, but railroad tracks did not exist at either end of the trip. 
Figure 3. Mission Factors 
After [Ref. 10, p. 311] 
Assuming that the infrastructure and supply support exist for the mission, the 
analyst will have a list of units with their associated personnel and material needs for the 
operation. At that time, the analyst will examine the units to determine their readiness to 
contribute to the particular operation being analyzed. 
4. Unit 
The process ~f analysis would include data acquired from the units that represents 
material and personnel readiness. However, unlike SORTS, this data should be the raw 
data from the unit, for example, the number of vehicles ready for use, the ordinance 
available, the actual personnel assigned and their qualifications. Additionally, very 
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similar data would be acquired from the supply and support systems. This would be 
information which the analyst would no doubt store in a computerized database. To 
augment this information, the analyst would use subjective reports of the unit's 
performance in live exercises. To analyze the leadership of the unit, the analyst would 
again use subjective reports of officers' performance in war games. The combination of 
all these factors coupled with the experience of the analyst, would lead the analyst to 
conclusions about the capabilities of the unit. At this point, the analyst has a picture of the 
readiness of this unit to perform a particular mission. This is the only meaningful 
information this analysis has generated. The analyst cannot generate a magic number 
which will tell the political and military leadership how much money to spend to improve 
the readiness of this unit, but the analyst can tell the leadership in what ways this unit 
could or could not contribute to the success of the mission being analyzed. 
5. Summary 
The scenario in the preceding sections is quite possible for a very small operation 
involving a limited number of units who are not in competition for resources in a wartime 
context. However, if this operation were to be performed to determine the readiness of a 
large number of units participating in an operation, it would also need a large number of 
analysts, but even then it would be impossible for any one analyst to have a picture of the 
entire operation. 
The military analysts would have an extremely intricate and difficult task for even 
a small military mission. One of the ways which the analyst could be assisted is with a 
computer system that would include support for the hundreds of factors that the analyst 
must consider when reaching his conclusion. This system could either be a decision 
support system which would use a mathematical function to weight the choices for the 
analyst. The system could also be as proposed in this study, an expert system which uses 
a set of rules to reach conclusions and which attempts to duplicate the human analyst 
process. Both systems would provide flexibility, and allow for "what if' questions and 
multiple scenarios. Both types of systems are based on models which can be updated with 
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new information when it becomes available. We have chosen to address a computerized 
system based on the expert system model for the subject of this study. 
An expert system model was chosen because a decision support system uses 
single values at the far leaves of the decision tree to represent the effect of a factor on the 
decision. If the variable is a measurable quantity, for example budget authority, then a 
scale or metric is easily developed to balance it with other factors in the decision. 
However, some factors lack an easily quantifiable metric, for example, a weapon's 
effectiveness, and this metric then becomes the best estimate of the developer of the 
system. 
In expert systems the development of this metric is avoided by encoding the 
expert's estimates in the knowledge base as a set of rules. This has two very practical 
effects. The first is that it is not necessary to have a complete picture of the system when 
installing modification. The second is that the reasoning process of the expert is well 
documented in the rules themselves. These two effects lead to a system that is easier to 
maintain and modify. 
B. EXPERT SYSTEMS 
Expert systems attempt to duplicate an expert human's decision process. This is 
done by interviewing experts in the field and developing a set of rules that mirror the 
experts' decision making process. This set of rules is then used as a knowledge base in a 
computer program. 
An expert system program differs from other decision support systems, because it 
relies upon a knowledge base and the inference engine. [Ref. 11, p. 4] 
The reasons to build an expert system are: 
• A shortage of experts and specialists. 
• Need to preserve an expert's knowledge. 
• High cost of expert advice. 
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• Critical requirements of expert advice. 
• Routine detailed-dependent decision making. [Ref. 11, p.407] 
From this list the measurement of readiness is clearly covered by routine detailed-
dependent decision making. Although the missions for a unit are required infrequently, 
measurement of a unit's readiness is a daily procedure. Even though measurement is 
performed on a daily basis, it has a subjective element which lends itself to expert system 
support. The process of measuring readiness must be performed frequently whether or not 
an expert is available to analyze readiness. 
The unit can, at any time, be called upon to perform the missions for which it was 
designed. Time in this case would be measured in terms of the mission. Units which are 
to be mobilized, in a crisis or time of war have a different view of critical time than a unit 
which is ready for deployment on a moment's notice. 
Expert systems can perform the role of either a trained user or an intelligent 
assistant to a trained user. In the role of a trained user, expert systems are used widely to 
create database queries. In the role of an assistant, expert systems have been developed to 
conduct bank audits, to provide a natural language interface for an untrained user, and to 
configure equipment for a salesman. In the military arena, research expert systems have 
been built to plan air attacks, troubleshoot equipment and train personnel. 
1. Concepts of an Expert System 
An expert system consists of the components shown in Figure 4. The knowledge 
base is unique to an expert system and may be thought of as an executable database of 
rules. The inference engine serves the same purpose as a program interpreter in a 
language such as BASIC. The explanation facility uses the output of the inference engine 
to inform the user which rules from the knowledge base were used in the system's 
"reasoning". [Ref. 11, p. 5] 
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2. Knowledge Base 
The knowledge base is a set of rules which represent the expert's knowledge in a 
specified domain. An example of rules for an infantry unit might be as follows: 
User 
Interface Knowledge Base 
Data 
Explanation 
Facility 
Figure 4. Information Flow in an Expert System 
After [Ref. 11, p. 5] 
IF (Unit has< 76,000 rounds of small arms ammunition) THEN 
The Unit may not be used for an Assault 
The Unit may be used to Ambush 
The Unit may be used to Guard 
The Unit must be resupplied before moving 
Output 
The IF clause is termed the premise. If the premise is true, then the conclusions (the 
THEN clause) are "fired". In this case, if the unit has less than 76,000 rounds for small 
arms, the unit is not allowed to be used in an attack, but may be used to ambush enemy 
units or guard an installation. Additionally, this rule will fire a conclusion that the unit 
must be resupplied before it is moved to another location. 
These rules are often grouped in the knowledge base in collections of rules called 
frames. Frames represent the context in which the rule should be applied. In this case, the 
context would be a small combat unit in combat. Another set of rules might represent the 
unit in training or the deployment of the unit in a crisis. 
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Each rule in the knowledge base is made up of two parts, the conditional part (the 
IF clause) and the conclusions (the THEN clause). Evaluation of the IF clause may 
require data retrieval from one or more external databases. For the example above, the 
expert system would have to retrieve the number of rounds of small arms ammunition for 
the unit being considered. These data values may be found in a relational database, a 
query to be performed on a data base or from the user, a procedure to perform on the 
computer system, or even a recursive query for the same expert system. These data 
attributes drive the system and are the only variables that affect the output of the system. 
The rules that represent the expert's knowledge are fixed at the design stage and may 
even be implemented in program code. 
Rules are derived from interviewing experts. Useful guidelines for interviewing 
experts for the purpose of developing the knowledge base are: 
• Interview the best of the experts; this has the best chance of producing a 
working system with a significant degree of credibility. 
• Ensure that the expert being interviewed has an understanding of the system 
that is being designed. 
• Prior to the interview, gather training material and literature in the field to 
obtain the basic knowledge. 
• Collect for each fact gained from the expert a weighting that represents the 
expert's belief in the reliability of that fact. 
• Ensure that the expert participates in the actual construction and debugging of 
the system. 
3. Inference Engine 
The purpose of the inference engine is to search through the knowledge base and 
fire the rules whose premise are true. These rules represent the expert's knowledge and 
constants. Rules that are fired generate conclusions which are added to the knowledge 
base and allow other rules to fire. The final output of the inference engine will be the 
conclusions that were developed from the firing of the rules and the values of the 
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constants in the knowledge base. An example of a set of rules for determining what unit 
will participate in a mission is shown in Figure 5. 
IF 
Infantry AND Artillery 
THEN 
Ground Support 
IF 
Supply Support AND Order of Battle 
THEN 
Figure 5. Rules 
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IF 
Mechanized Infantry 
THEN 
Ground Support 
Another component of the inference engine is a search mechanism. The purpose 
of the search mechanism is to search through the rules for rules which can be fired. The 
search mechanism is usually performed by one of two methods, forward chaining or 
backward chaining. 
a. Forward Chaining 
In forward chaining the inference engine operates by moving from the 
rules and conclusions to the goal. A flow chart for forward chaining is shown in Figure 6. 
Figure 5 is a set of rules whose only goal is to determine whether a mission can be 
performed. In forward chaining the inference engine would first check the rules that 
enable an infantry unit, artillery unit and a mechanized infantry unit to see if these units 
are available for the mission. In the chain of rules it can be seen that these three rules 
must fire before any other rule will fire. Even the rules that have to do with supply 
support and air support cannot be made true unless the rule for ground support is true. 
Using the flow chart in Figure 6, the inference engine first builds a list of 
all rules where the premise matches a fact in the knowledge base. In this case, we will 
assume that and infantry unit, artillery unit and a mechanized infantry unit are true or 
available for the mission. In the next step, the inference engine replaces the premise of the 
rules with the facts that the units are available. The next block in the diagram discards 
rules that were fired by a common premise that led to a common conclusion. Next, a 
decision is made as to whether any rule has been fired. If a rule has been fired, conflict 
resolution takes place and the inference engine decides on which rule to add to the 
knowledge base. This is an efficiency mechanism to decrease the number of rules that 
will be searched. The chosen rule is added to the knowledge base and the process begins 
again. Only when no new rules are fired will the process stop. 
In the rules in Figure 5, one or the other rules of the rules "infantry unit 
and artillery unit" or "mechanize infantry unit" will be discarded by the duplicate 
conclusion block because they led to the same conclusion of ground support. Forward 
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chaining requires some kind of conflict resolution system because any number of rules 
may lead to the same conclusion through a series of "And" and "Or" operation. 
START 
Create a Ust or AD Rules 
Where the Premise 
Matches a Fact 
l 
Substitute the Premises In 
the list or Rules 
l 
Discard Rules that have 
Duplicate Conclusion to a 
Conclusions In Knowledge 
Base 
No~ Rules B;enFired 
Yes 
Use a Conftlct Resolution 
Method to Select One or 
the Fired Rules 
1 
Output the Results, 
Add the Selected Rules 
Conclusion to the 
Last Conclusion Knowledge Base 
I 
Figure 6. Forward Chaining 
b. Backward Chaining 
A technique for the search process that is most relevant to this study is 
called backward chaining. In a system programmed using this algorithm, inferences are 
made from a goal, for example, the unit's participation in an operation, back through the 
chain of rules in an attempt to find a set of rules that will allow the achievement of that 
goal (Figure 7). After performing this operation, if the program was unable to achieve the 
goal, it will have the information as to why it was not possible to achieve the goal. 
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Using a flowchart in Figure 7 to perform backward chaining, the mission is the 
initial goal; since the goal is not equal to a fact, the inference engine will look through the 
rules for a rule with a conclusion of "mission." In this case, the rule is "supply support 
and order of battle." The inference engine will establish new goals of "supply support" 
and "order of battle." On the next pass through the rules, the inference engine will check 
for a conclusion that is "supply support" and "order of battle." Assuming that "supply 
support" is true (a fact), the inference engine will then find a rule with a conclusion of 
"order of battle" and set the goal to "order of battle". This process will continue until a 
fact is found that enables all of the conclusions that have been added as a goal. If the 
engine, for example, could not find a conclusion of "air support" then the process would 
end and the goal would not succeed. In this case the reason that the goal did not succeed 
would be "air support" is not true and therefore the goal of "order of battle" could not be 
true. Basically, the inference engine establishes new goals for each pass and tries to find a 
conclusion which will make the goal true. If it finds that conclusion, then the conclusion 
becomes a new goal and the process moves further down the list of rules until a fact is 
found to be true and equal to the current goal. 
The Goal Succeeds Based 
on the Fad tn the Database 
Yes 
Establish 
Initial Goal 
The Goal FaDs Because of 
the Conclusion Part of the 
CuJTent Goal 
Establish New Goal 
of Conclusion 
and Previous Goal 
Figure 7. Backward Chaining 
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4. User's Interface 
The user interface to an expert system occurs ·in the form of dialogue between the 
user and the system. The user should be able to query the system for information about 
how a decision was reached. The user should be able to interactively change the 
parameters of the expert system process and capture reports representing the expert 
system's output. The user interface is particularly critical for determining the acceptance 
of the system. An interface that is difficult to manage will not attract the high level users 
that the system in this study is intended to support. The user's interface must present 
information in terms that the user deals with daily. A specialized interface may only 
attract the computer "gurus" who are not the intended users and are unlikely to be 
involved in any decision making process. 
One of the ways to solve the problem of the acceptance of this system by high 
level users is to build a user interface based on the concept of natural language interface. 
Figure 8 shows a natural language interface where the user's requests are converted to a 
tree structure (parser) that represents the user's request. This information is used to find 
or develop a procedure that will query the expert system in order to fulfill the user's 
request. These systems are widely used in large databases. This information is then 
formatted by the generator portion of the system for presentation to the user. For 
example, the user makes a request "list the infantry units that are available for an attack." 
PARSER 
1nte111ret User Input and 
Capture EngUsh Syntax 
GENERATOR 
Format and Display 
Results oflnfonnatlon 
USER INTERFACE 
Figure 8. Natural Language User's Interface 
After [Ref. 11, p. 309] 
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The system would look for a procedure which would include the functions of infantry 
units, and produce results about the ones that can be used in an attack. This may be a pre-
programmed procedure or, for a very sophisticated system, and may be developed by the 
information manager portion of the interface. These results would be displayed to the user 
as a list. 
5. Uncertainty 
Expert systems are especially relevant for applications that fall between art and 
science. A field which has progressed to the point where there is a large body of 
knowledge and rules of thumb but has not yet achieved a purely mathematical 
formulation for that knowledge is a prime candidate for the use of expert systems. A good 
example is the measurement of readiness. When interviewing an expert in a particular 
field, the expert will often express his rules using words like "usually", "almost always", 
"probably", etc. This information is added to the knowledge base in the form of a 
certainty factor. [Ref. 11] 
Each rule in the knowledge base may have a certainty factor associated with it. 
This factor represents the trust that the expert has in that particular rule. By combining the 
inference engine with a threshold based on this factor, the operator can adjust the system 
to generate a more certain result. What this factor does is allow the inference engine to 
adjust its dependence on the knowledge base when creating a result. If two rules result in 
the same rule being fired and one has a high certainty factor, then it does not matter what 
the certainty factor of the other rule is. The result will depend only on the first rule. A low 
certainty factor indicates that there is no factor for that rule and any rule leading to the 
same result with a greater certainty factor has contributed to the result. 
C. PROPOSED SYSTEM 
This section will present a structure representing the major components of an 
output oriented readiness measurement system employing expert systems and database 
technology. This proposal is not a detailed first design of such a system but rather an 
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introduction to the elements that would be necessary to create a working system (Figure 
9). 
Create Database 
Queries for the 
Pmpose of 
Producing Analyzed 
or Derived Data 
MISSION ~ 
DATA V 
Analyze a Unit's 
Conbibution to a Specific 
Mission, Produce both 
Readiness Data and 
Recommend Units to 
Participate in a Mission 
~'"'"::=:::""':::""':::.=·:::=::.=·::=:::=:::"'":::""~::: 
HHEXPlltRT+~ 
:iH~¥$~ij:!iii 
Readiness Data 
Figure 9. Proposed Readiness Measurement System 
1. Databases 
There are multiple data sets required for the creation of this system. 
a. RawData 
Raw data at the unit level is exactly the data collected by the SORTS on 
equipment readiness, personnel training information and personnel assigned. This data 
could be augmented as suggested in the GAO Report with leadership information, 
operational tempo, and other factors. For an efficient system, this data should be obtained 
by tapping the existing reporting mechanisms. For example, equipment readiness data can 
be obtained from the supply process of ordering and receiving parts, and training data is 
available from training commands and personnel records. In the author's experience, new 
reporting systems lead to the generation of a "boilerplate" report to meet reporting 
requirements. This "boilerplate" report is a source of misinformation. Its design is 
normally dictated by the reporter's perception of the simplest report that will pass up the 
50 
chain-of-command without being rejected. It would be much better to monitor real 
processes like a maintenance unit ordering a part for a piece of equipment which is not 
functional. Table 3 presents examples of raw data for an automated readiness 
measurement system. 
Personnel 
Officers Assigned 
Enlisted Assigned 
Non-commissioned Officer's Assigned 
Personal Qualifications 
etc. 
Training 
Unit Qualifications 
Training Hours 
etc. 
Logistics 
Fuel 
Ammunition 
Maintenance Support Parts 
etc. 
Maintenance 
Equipment Reliability 
Equipment Status 
Support Requirements 
etc. 
Table 3. Raw Data 
b. Derived Data 
Derived data is data that is created to represent mission requirements. 
This data essentially represents the unit as a resource for the mission. If the unit does not 
have the capability to perform the mission, then it will not be used for that resource. For 
example, an infantry unit may have enough non-commissioned officers to be used to 
ambush enemy troops, but may not have enough to be broken up into squads for guarding 
a fuel supply. In this case, the raw data is the percentage of non-commissioned officers 
assigned to the unit and the derived data is the number of squads that can be assigned a 
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non-commissioned officer or an officer. Table 4 presents examples of derived data for an 
automated readiness measurement system. 
Personnel 
Ratio of Experienced to Inexperienced Personnel 
etc. 
Training 
Mission Qualifications 
Level of Experience 
etc. 
Logistics 
Expected Support 
etc. 
Maintenance 
Expected Reliability 
Expected Repair Time 
etc. 
Table 4. Derived Data 
c. Mission Database 
This database represents the missions that are being considered for the 
units. This database should be constructed in terms of the requirements for the mission 
which must directly relate to the derived data or analysis databases. At this level several 
expert systems would perform a variety of operations. A system could be constructed to 
optimize the selection of units for the mission in order to suggest the actual units to 
assign to a mission. Another system more in line with the purpose of this study would be 
to query the database to determine what units are not being considered for the operation 
and produce reports detailing why they were not considered. A history of these reports is 
in fact the readiness of the unit. As time passes the unit will enter and leave the status of a 
participant. A further analysis of the reasons the unit was not selected will give an 
indication of what management or budget steps to take to improve the unit's readiness. 
d. Summary 
In summary, the idea is that from the raw data, an expert system would be 
used to generate more sophisticated kinds of information to be used directly in the 
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planning of a mission. As far as the explanation facility for the expert system is 
concerned, the system will identify the raw data that led to the conclusion that the unit's 
equipment, leadership, etc. are not sufficient for the unit to participate in a particular 
mission. 
2. Knowledge Base 
The creation of a knowledge base in commercial systems intended for business 
use is performed only during the initial design of the software. In the large system 
contemplated here this would be an ongoing process intended to refine the operation of 
the system and add to its capabilities. 
3. Inference Engine 
The inference engine should use a variety of techniques to search the knowledge 
base for rules that are fired. The fastest systems use the forward chaining method to 
search the database for rules that are enabled. However, forward chaining does not 
produce the reason that a goal was not achieved. A common technique is to use backward 
chaining to find rules. When a rule is found, the inference engine looks at its conclusions 
and then finds other incidences of those conclusions in the knowledge base and attempts 
to fire those rules by using the forward chaining method. In the case of the proposed 
system, the inference engine need not produce results quickly. If the system uses real time 
data from the units, it would be run continuously and can trade time for speed. 
4. Feedback and Maintenance 
A key consideration about any computer system is the ability to maintain and 
upgrade the system with new technologies. Additionally, this system should possess 
feedback mechanisms to correct errors and improve the initial design. Since our proposed 
system will be used in life and death decision making, its maintenance must be an 
ongoing process. The best way to obtain useful feedback is to designate a group of people 
whose primary purpose is to suggest improvements to the system. As in the electrical 
world, the most useful feedback is negative feedback. Of course this group must be 
balanced by the supporters of the system who will modify and repair it. 
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For the proposed system there are two maintenance areas. The first area is the 
maintenance of the expert system software. This software would be maintained using the 
same techniques as any large software project. For this type of maintenance there are two 
subtypes, perfective and adaptive maintenance. Perfective maintenance is the repair of 
errors in the original design or implementation. This type of maintenance will decrease 
over time. The other subtype is adaptive maintenance, this is maintenance that adds 
functionality to the system or maintenance as a result of upgrades to the system when 
replacing obsolete hardware or software. The adaptive maintenance subtype will increase 
over time, and requires a full design and testing process. At some point in time adaptive 
maintenance may lead to the decision to rebuild the entire system. To anticipate this 
rebuild decision there should be a rigorous configuration management system in place 
throughout the design and implementation of the system. [Ref. 12, pp. 148-151] 
The second area of maintenance concerns the expert system knowledge base. 
Perfective maintenance for the knowledge base is based on the original documentation 
developed when interviewing the experts. Like perfective maintenance for systems 
software this maintenance will decrease over time. Adaptive maintenance will be used to 
expand the knowledge base and add new capabilities to the system. This maintenance for 
the knowledge base must also pass through the complete design cycle. 
One of the unique features of an expert system is that in use, it produces a record 
of its results. These results can be used to validate the system when it is modified during 
maintenance or modification. These historical results and the inputs they were derived 
from can be used to validate the new design. 
5. Example Expert System 
The following scenario will be used to demonstrate how the system shown in 
Figure 9 would function. 
The mission is to support missile patrol boats that have been dispersed to small 
harbors outside of the nation's main naval bases. This mission is performed in three 
contexts: in time of war to protect the missile patrol boats and enable them to prevent 
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destruction in a surprise attack; in time of training to prepare personnel from different 
services for joint operations. 
The expert system will be used to determine whether an Army transportation unit 
can be used to provide spare parts and fuel to these widely dispersed naval units. The 
mission data factors to be considered are the parts support for the naval units, the 
required fuel, and munitions. These factors must be considered in terms of the context of 
the mission. For a crisis or training, this mission will have access to the normal resources 
of fuel and munitions. In a wartime situation, the mission's priority will determine its 
access to resources. In this case, the units are used to prevent an invasion and would have 
a very high priority in wartime. 
The expert system is to determine directly whether an Army transportation unit 
has the capacity to deliver supply, fuel and munitions to these vessels. The pl~n for the 
dispersement of these vessels calls for the use of at least ten small harbors. The Army unit 
must be able to pump fuel for these ten missile patrol boats. This Army unit must also 
deliver munitions and possess special equipment for the loading of missiles. In Table 5 is 
a sample list of the rules that describe the Army transportation unit effect on the above 
mission. 
From Table 5 it can be seen that there are only two outputs that relate to the Army 
unit support of the missile patrol boats. The Army unit can either be capable of 
performing the mission or incapable. The numerical outputs in tons of fuel and missiles 
are factual information which will be entered into the knowledge base on the first pass of 
the inference engine. Factual· information not in the knowledge base will be acquired 
from the first expert system in Figure 9. 
On the second pass when the inference engine examines Rule 1, and if the context 
is a crisis or war, in order to resolve Rule 1, the inference engine must acquire two facts: 
the tanker capacity of the Army unit and the mission requirement. The mission 
requirement has been entered in the knowledge base during the first fact by Rule 8 and 9. 
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Either Rule 8 or 9 was entered into the knowledge base depending upon whether the 
context was a crisis or war. Let's suppose that the context is war, then the minimum 
Rule Context Premise Conclusion 
No. 
1 Crisis/War Tanker Capacity is < mission The unit is not capable of 
requirement performing the mission 
2 Training Tanker Capacity is < mission The unit is capable of performing 
requirement the mission 
3 Crisis/War Cargo Capacity is < mission The unit is not capable of 
requirement performing the mission 
4 Training Cargo Capacity is < mission The unit is capable of performing 
requirement the mission 
5 Crisis/War The Number of Drivers is < the The unit is not capable of 
Number of Missile Boats performing the mission 
6 Training The Number of Drivers is < the The unit is capable of performing 
Number of Missile Boats the mission 
7 Crisis/War/Training The Number of Officers and Non- The unit is riot capable of 
commissioned Officers is < the performing the mission 
Number of Detachments Needed 
to Delivery Fuel or Supplies 
8 Crisis Fuel Requirement per Missile Boat 22 tons 
9 War Fuel Requirement per Missile Boat 88 tons 
10 Training Fuel Requirement per Missile Boat 1 tons 
11 Crisis Missile Requirement for Missile 1 ton 
Boat 
12 War Missile Requirement for Missile 6 tons 
Boat 
13 Training Missile Requirement for Missile 1 ton 
Boat 
14 Crisis/War/Training Non-commissioned Officers < The unit is not capable of 
Number of Missile Boats performing the mission 
15 Crisis/War/Training Commissioned Officers < 1/2 The unit is not capable of 
Number of Missile Boats performing the mission 
16 Crisis/War Number of Trained Pump The unit is not capable of 
Operators < the Number of Missile performing the mission 
Boats 
17 Training Number of Trained Pump The unit is capable of performing 
Operators < the Number of Missile the mission 
Boats 
18 Crisis/War Number of Trained Crane The unit is not capable of 
Operators < the Number of Missile performing the mission 
Boats 
19 Training Number of Trained Crane The unit is capable of performing 
Operators < the Number of Missile the mission 
Boats 
Table 5. Mission Expert Rules 
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mission requirement is 90 tons of fuel oil per missile patrol boat. To resolve the rest of 
Rule 1, the Expert System would query the analyst Expert System for the tanker capacity 
of the unit. The analyst Expert System would query the unit's data to determine the 
number of tanker trucks that were operational and their liquid capacity. This data would 
be returned to the first system and it would indicate that the unit has 1 0 trucks with a 
capacity of 22 tons each for a total tanker capacity in the unit of 220 tons. In this case, the 
mission requirement is for 900 tons of fuel for the 1 0 missile patrol boats and the Army 
unit will not have the capacity to support this operation in wartime. However, if this were 
a crisis, the fuel requirement per missile patrol boat would be 22 tons and the unit would 
be capable of supporting the mission. So, the rule would not be fired for a crisis or 
training. Similarly, Rule 3 operates on the cargo capacity of the unit in a crisis or a war. 
This mission is necessary for the Army unit to establish detachments at each small 
harbor. Rule 7, 14, 15, are intended to ensure that the leadership requirements are met in 
each of these detachments. Rule 16 is to ensure that there is at least one trained pump 
operator at each site. Rule 17 is for training and is to allow units with less than the 
required number of pump operators to train. The leadership rule, however, is still applied 
during training to ensure that valid training takes place. If the inference engine passes 
through this table without firing a new rule, then the result is the unit is capable of 
performing the mission. If the inference engine determines that a unit is not capable 
because it does not satisfy the premise conditions for the rule fired, then that will be the 
reason the unit is not capable. In this case, forward chaining can generate information 
because the rules are expressed in terms of readiness measurement. A better system 
would be one that not only provides information as to why a unit is not ready to perform 
a mission, but indicates the units that could perform that mission. This would require 
backward chaining. 
6. Resources 
For the above mission in context of war, the fuel resource would be competed for 
by multiple missions. This would be resolved through a system of mission priorities and 
57 
reference counting done in the analyst expert system. A mission would mark a resource 
as being referenced and only a higher priority mission would be able to remove this tag. 
In the knowledge base of the analytical expert system, the rule would be as follows: 
IF (Marked AND The Mission Priority <Referenced Mission Priority) THEN 
The Resource Is Not Available 
IF (Marked AND The Mission Priority> Referenced Mission Priority) THEN 
The Resource Is Available 
The Resource Is Referenced To This Mission 
D. SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT ISSUES 
If the proposed system could be built and performed reasonably well, a nation 
would have a means of measuring the readiness of its armed forces. However, w~at must 
always be kept in mind is that these are life and death decisions and in human society 
those decisions are ultimately left to matured and experienced leadership, not to 
machines. This system would be meant to assist the political and military leadership in 
their decisions, not to replace them. 
1. Large Systems 
Recently, large engineering projects involving software have been a source of 
popular humor. Of note is the Denver Airport baggage system which to date is still not 
functional. One way to avoid these consequences in a large system is to first build a small 
system, perfect it and add to it until the designer has achieved a system that meets larger 
needs. By piecemeal construction, no decision of the designer will affect the final design 
to such an extent as to make it worthless. If the ROC were to implement such a system, 
this prototyping process should be followed in its construction. The ROC has an 
advantage because it does not have an existing system. If like the U.S. the ROC had an 
existing system, inevitably the new system would have to perform the same processes as 
the existing one to be accepted. If there is a fundamental flaw in those processes, no 
amount of technology will be able to overcome it. 
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2. Political Issues 
Politically, any system which measured the readiness of units to perform specific 
missions would probably not be well received. First there would be endless debate on 
whether the system correctly identified situations of unreadiness or readiness. Political 
leaders almost always come to the table with an opinion on readiness with reasoning 
unrelated to reality. A politician must sell his vision of reality to the voters. If there were 
an unbiased measurement of this reality, then the readiness of military units would only 
be a budgetary discussion. Because there is no picture that all parties can agree on, some 
components of readiness will always be subjective, and the dire consequences of a 
misstep, readiness is still an emotional issue and naturally has appeal to the politician. 
In the military arena readiness is used to convince the legislative body to fund 
certain projects. In this case, if there were a picture all could agree on, not only would 
some projects not be funded but assets might be reduced. The legislative body that 
reduces military assets is of course playing on the appeal of lower taxes and more money 
for the civilian sector. These factors are so much an integral part of a democratic nation's 
political debate that the best that could be expected from such a system is that it identify 
areas for improvement and enlighten the political leadership as to what is possible for 
their military forces. 
3. Economic Issues 
With this system economic decisions could be made related to how many units 
must actually remain as participants in an operation for the nation to be sufficiently 
defended. This could be of great economic advantage to the defense of a country with no 
hostile intentions for which defense may be a very expensive operation. The burden of 
maintaining a defense against a neighbor, who attacks only when his forces are fully 
ready, far exceeds the cost of a military buildup culminating in an invasion. attempt. The 
economic leverage of the offensive nation in this situation could be the primary reason for 
the hostile attitude of that nation. In the case of the ROC and the PRC, the PRC may wish 
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to require the ROC to invest its income in the military rather than the ROC's economic 
engine. As a result, the ROC's growth over time may fall behind the PRC's. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study has introduced the reader to the geopolitical position of the ROC, 
especially as it relates to the PRC. The military mission of the ROC's Armed Forces is 
almost exclusively devoted to the defense of the Island of Taiwan and its surrounding 
waters. The ROC has a minimal system for measuring readiness. The U.S. readiness 
system is adapted for the needs of a nation with worldwide commitments, and is the 
result of a readiness measurement system that has evolved over many years. The new 
defensive role of the ROC Armed Forces and the acquisition of equipment from outside 
of the ROC leads to a requirement that the ROC have a better system of measuring 
readiness. The literature on readiness indicates that readiness should be measured in 
outputs or the capabilities of a unit, not in inputs or the material and personnel of a unit. 
With these conclusions, the author makes the following recommendations: 
• The ROC Armed Forces should take advantage of the fact that it has no 
established system for measuring readiness and create a system based on 
outputs. The system should use the latest technologies to measure readiness. 
• The ROC Armed Forces should take advantage of the new technologies in 
computers and networks to establish an information system to record and 
archive maintenance and supply data. This system would not only be used by 
the readiness measurement system, but would improve the maintenance and 
support of equipment. 
• The ROC Armed Forces should establish a similar system as the one above for 
recording training and qualification information. 
• The ROC Armed Forces should take advantage of its staff structure to 
establish metrics for measuring the performance of its Officer Corps in 
wargames and simulations. 
• The ROC should first build the first expert system as shown in Figure 9, 
Chapter IV. This system would produce data for high level decision makers in 
terms of unit capabilities. Later, the second expert system could be built for 
the measurement of readiness. 
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In summary, the ROC should take advantage of the fact that there is no existing 
system and therefore, there will be little bureaucratic inertia to overcome when a new 
system is established. The ROC is moving into a period where the legislative body of the 
ROC will be more inclined to please voters than the military sector of society. To provide 
for the ROC's defense in an era of decreasing budgets, the ROC Armed Forces must 
develop new management methods that make efficient use of decreasing resources. 
The literature indicates that the major problem with measuring readiness is that 
most current systems measure readiness in terms of personnel and material resources of a 
unit, rather than in terms of a unit's capabilities in relationship to a particular mission. 
The expert system proposed in this study is designed to measure readiness in terms of 
capabilities or outputs. 
The benefits of this expert system approach are: 
• Institutionalization of military analytical expertise 
• Consistent measurement of readiness across units 
• Reduction of subjective evaluations of readiness 
• Audit trails for readiness-based decisions 
Disadvantages of this approach are: 
• Expense of developing such a large knowledge base 
• Difficulty of maintaining knowledge bases 
• Time required to validate expert systems software is much greater than 
conventional software. [Ref. 11, p. 395] 
• Expert systems usefulness advances slowly over a long period of time. [Ref. 
11, p. 395] 
• Expert systems always make mistakes. [Ref. 11, p. 396] 
• Expert systems cannot recognize the boundaries of their knowledge base. 
[Ref. 11, p. 395] 
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